



# Korean Futures Project



## International Simulation

26-28 January 2000

CENTER FOR NAVAL  
WARFARE STUDIES

DECISION  
STRATEGIES  
DEPARTMENT

DSD Research Report 00-3

<b>Report Documentation Page</b>			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<p>Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.</p>				
1. REPORT DATE <b>JAN 2000</b>	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED -		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Korean Futures Project: International Simulation</b>			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
			5b. GRANT NUMBER	
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
			5e. TASK NUMBER	
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Naval War College, Decision Strategies Department, Newport, RI, 02841</b>			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>The original document contains color images.</b>				
14. ABSTRACT <b>see report</b>				
15. SUBJECT TERMS				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>28</b>
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>		19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

**Korean Futures Project  
International Simulation  
26-28 January 2000**

**by**

**C. Dale Walton**

*Sponsored by the  
United States Naval War College*

This report contains the main findings of a simulation conducted by the Decision Strategies Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. The contents of the report reflect the views of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

## **Acknowledgements**

The author wishes to thank AMB Paul Taylor and Dr. Lawrence Modisett for their thoughtful comments on early drafts of this report. The author also wishes to thank Mr. Warren Carmen for the design of the cover and his assistance in the printing of this document. The Korea Chronology was constructed by COL John Taska. The scenario material contained herein is based on the work of Mr. Andres Vaart and CDR Bart Bolger, who also made many helpful contributions and suggestions to this report.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>BACKGROUND</b>	<b>1</b>
The Korean Futures Project	1
The International Game/Simulation Series	1
Exercise Vision and Objectives	1
Scenario 1	1
<b>SIMULATION SESSIONS</b>	<b>3</b>
Scenario 1, Stage 1	3
Initial Positions	4
Scenario 1, Stage 2	6
Scenario 1, Stage 3	7
Out of Role Discussions	9
Anonymous GroupSystems™ Comments	11
Alternative Scenario	11
Anonymous GroupSystems™ Comments on Other Questions	13
<b>GENERAL OBSERVATIONS</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>POLICY IMPLICATIONS</b>	<b>15</b>
Concluding Thoughts	16
<b>KOREA CHRONOLOGY</b>	<b>18</b>

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The main purpose of this simulation was to explore international reactions to political change in North Korea and to explore the broader security implications of developments in the North. Players also confronted related difficulties in the scenario, such as refugee flows across international borders. To accomplish this, the simulation engaged mid- to high-level participants from fifteen countries in a United Nations Security Council setting; every country except North Korea was represented by a national. The following observations emerged from the simulation:

- In an effort to avoid provoking negative reactions, the governments of the United States and South Korea reacted cautiously to developments in North Korea. Both South Korea and the United States expressed concern that vigorous action on their part could impede possible positive change and/or cause an existing crisis to worsen; they expressed a willingness to act circumspectly so long as the DPRK did not undertake militarily aggressive actions. Also, the United States stated its concern that assertive action on its part could undermine Seoul's long-term efforts to build strong diplomatic ties with other countries in the region. Although many countries welcomed this posture, several found it surprising; particularly strong action was expected from the United States.
- The representatives of several countries thought that a scenario of peaceful and gradual economic and political integration of the Korean Peninsula was implausibly optimistic even though current US and South Korean policy strives for such an outcome. However, a United States representative responded that significant change can occur in five years and by 2005 the political environment on the Peninsula may be favorable to such an outcome.
- Unification of Korea could prompt China, Russia, and possibly other countries to press for rapid removal of US troops from Korea; some speculated that in turn American withdrawal from Korea could have a "domino effect" on its presence elsewhere in the region, including Japan.
- There are strong pressures to resist unification that are reflected in South Korean apprehension about its political, economic, and social costs; also, the Russian representative sounded a cautionary note based on his country's difficult experience in making the transition to democracy and a market economy, while the German representative underscored the costs of unification with a poorer country.
- The lack of good intelligence on North Korea and of North-South CBMs makes it impossible to dismiss the possibility of a war between the Koreas even though it is probable that neither country desires such a conflict; the South Korean representative was particularly concerned about the possibility that conflict between rival military forces in North Korea could spill over to the South.
- There was general agreement that regardless of political complications, a prompt response to humanitarian emergencies was important, and the representatives of several countries indicated a willingness to expend substantial resources to diffuse a refugee crisis in North Korea.
- European countries would likely show a high degree of cohesion in responding to a crisis in Korea and would likely address the situation through the European Union rather than unilaterally.

Scenario play also revealed a number of policy implications that should be considered by decisionmakers:

- It is unlikely that international forums such as the UNSC would be able to cope effectively with a Korean crisis unless key countries such as the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia were in agreement on common action. However, it is probable that the latter two countries would see significant divergence between some of their interests and the interests of other countries, especially the United States. However, there were some confluent interests, including the prevention of mass refugee migration.
- Most countries other than Russia and China would look to the United States and South Korea for guidance in a Korean crisis, and would be reluctant to act independently even in international forums such as the UNSC.
- In the event of unification, Russia and China would strongly oppose deployment of US troops in former North Korea.
- Outside powers, including China and Russia, have little direct leverage over events in North Korea.

- Most powers share a common interest in stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Except in regard to humanitarian aid, there was a great reluctance on the part of most countries to act forcefully in response to the crisis scenario presented in the simulation. Moreover, both China and Russia were particularly wary of initiatives presented by other countries, and frequently expressed concern for North Korean sovereignty. Even seemingly small issues sometimes stymied international action. Moreover, the international community was unable to guide events significantly in the North as it had little leverage over North Korea and very limited information about political developments in that country.

During the simulation, one interesting area of agreement among participants emerged: a tendency to favor the status quo, or even a more hard-line North Korean regime, over instability on the Korean Peninsula. For various reasons, most countries saw instability as threatening to their interests; even South Korea expressed fear of rapid political change in the DPRK. Most countries—including the United States, Japan, Russia, and China—appeared relatively accepting of (although not altogether satisfied with) the status quo. This was a strong indication that the “long crisis” on the Korean Peninsula might endure for decades rather than soon resolving itself in a swift and peaceful unification or a terrible military confrontation.

## **BACKGROUND**

### **The Korean Futures Project**

The Decision Strategies Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College has undertaken a series of events intended to explore regional reactions to potential developments in North Korea and their implications for the security interests of the United States. The simulations and decision events in the series bring together U.S. and foreign experts from a variety of disciplines and areas of expertise to share their insights and interact with one another. The research results of the series are intended to inform the work of the Department of the Navy, other elements of the Department of Defense and the U.S. foreign affairs community generally.

Ambassador Paul D. Taylor directs the Korean Futures Project. A senior researcher in the Decision Strategies Department, he also chairs the Asia-Pacific Studies Group of the Naval War College. That group links members of the teaching and research faculty of the Naval War College and officers of the Navy Warfare Development Command who are engaged on work related to the Asia-Pacific region.

Mr. Andres Vaart and CDR Bart Bolger prepared the scenarios for the International Simulation, and Dr. Lawrence Modisett, Chairman of the Decision Strategies Department, briefed the participants. Ambassador Taylor directed the simulation, and COL John Taska, USMC prepared a background book for the event.

### **The International Game/Simulation Series**

Now in its sixth year the International Game/Simulation Series is sponsored by the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The events are political-military simulations that are designed to explore national, regional, and international perspectives on current and possible future issues. The events are oriented around national security issues; simulations are designed to explore crisis prevention, response, management, and resolution.

The participants, who are mid- to high-ranking diplomatic, defense, media, and academic experts from a variety of nations, make unique and valuable contributions to the Series. Their career experiences, coupled with their insights on national/regional perspectives, give the events an authenticity that cannot be duplicated in another setting. In other simulations, including many conducted by the US government, players are generally well-informed experts, but are not nationals of the countries they are asked to represent. No foreigner can be expected easily to internalize all of the important elements of another culture or react with fidelity to unforeseen events in the way a national might, and the Series is unique in bringing together highly qualified individuals who are citizens of the countries they represent.

Insights derived from the Series are available and will be made available in the future to academic institutions and various agencies with the US national security community.

### **Exercise Vision and Objectives**

The International Simulation brought together a highly qualified cross section of diplomats, academics, and military personnel to conduct a political-military simulation in a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) setting. Participants came from the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea), Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, France, Germany, Greece, Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), and North America (Canada and the United States). The role of the representative of North Korea was played by a foreigner with extensive personal knowledge of North Korea. All countries were represented by one delegate except the United Kingdom and the United States, which respectively fielded teams of two and three delegates. In addition, a control team, moderators, and observers from the US Naval War College and other institutions were present to oversee the exercise, assist participants, and perform other duties.

The simulation examined issues relevant to a Northeast Asian security crisis with international ramifications. The primary goal of the simulation was to explore the relationships among nations utilizing regional and global security fora.

Specific objectives included:

- To explore regional and global security issues.
- To explore crisis prevention, response, and resolution.
- To elicit representative national perspectives on Northeast Asia and global issues.
- To exercise conflict prevention, management, and resolution techniques.
- To enhance understanding of the opportunities and constraints on national policies.

## Scenario 1

Participants were introduced to the scenario background during an introductory event the evening before the game, and additional scenario information was provided the next morning. The scenario was not intended to predict the future but did raise important issues in Northeast Asian security. In this report, scenario conditions will be indicated by *italic* type, while regular type will be used for participant actions.

### *The Setting: January 2005*

*The North Korean economy has continued at zero percent growth since the year 2000, and 2004 was an unusually bad year. Industrial infrastructure has been poorly maintained, and is operating at a small fraction of capacity; transportation networks throughout the North are unreliable. Energy production has not improved, although progress has continued on the construction of nuclear reactors in the North by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as negotiated in the 1992 Agreed Framework Accord; completion of the reactors is expected in 2007. There are chronic food shortages, and foreign food assistance is required on an ongoing basis. Pockets of hunger and starvation exist, and the most recent harvest was poor. Also, the winter of 2004-05 was unusually severe. In the meantime, the South Korean economy has grown more rapidly than most analysts predicted and has more than recovered from the “Asian flu” economic shocks of the late 1990s.*

*In the years leading to 2005, Kim Chong-il has consolidated control of the power structure. He rules through the National Defense Commission; the state security network is intact and capable. However, under the uninspiring leadership of Kim, who lacks the dynamism and war hero image of his father, party strength is ebbing. Criminal activity is increasing throughout North Korea. While the loyalty of the military appears firm, reports indicate that material deprivation has spread to military elites.*

*Conventional North Korean forces are in general decline, and suffer from a lack of training, aging equipment, and poor supplies. However, missile and artillery forces are excepted from this general decline and are capable of threatening Seoul. The DPRK is believed to possess biological and chemical weapons, and to have sufficient fissionable material for one or two nuclear weapons. As conventional forces have weakened, doctrine has shifted to a greater reliance on weapons of mass destruction as a deterrent, and the DPRK Defense Minister has publicly stated that, “We will use any means at our disposal to protect our sovereignty.”*

*Although North Korea has increasingly relied on foreign food and energy aid, this dependence has not altered its foreign policy. The DPRK has demonstrated no sustained response to the “Sunshine Policy” pursued by South Korea since the late 1990s. Pyongyang has made fitful efforts to improve relations with the United States—for example, it has abided by promises to suspend missile flight testing—but these openings have been undermined by intransigence at crucial moments. Its priorities with respect to the United States are the continuing flow of energy aid (heavy fuel oil), sanctions relief, and securing the*

*withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula. Normalization of relations with Japan has not been achieved, and Tokyo provides no food aid to the DPRK. China and North Korea maintain correct relations and engage in bilateral military visits; Beijing provides food and energy aid at the same level as in the year 2000 and continues to return refugees. However, there has been no high-level summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries in recent year. Russia's relations with North Korea have improved, leading to the resumption of limited military assistance by Moscow to North Korea.*

*China and South Korea enjoy normal relations and have regular military exchanges, including bilateral maritime exercises. China and the United States, on the other hand, have frequently experienced strained relations because of human rights issues, Taiwan, the US military presence in East Asia, and American theatre missile defense (TMD) initiatives. China and Japan have correct relations, but there is recurrent tension over islands disputed between the two countries, US-Japanese cooperation on TMD, and perceived increases in Japanese military. China and Russia have continued to cooperate in the UN Security Council against US-led initiatives, and Russia continues to engage in military sales to Beijing.*

## SIMULATION SESSIONS

### **Scenario 1, Stage 1**

*On 26 January 2005, the death of Kim Chong-il was reported by the North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) as having occurred three days earlier, on 23 January. On 28 January, an unusually terse KCNA announcement said only that an official Funeral Committee comprised of "Politburo members" had been formed and that the Kim legacy was to continue. A memorial ceremony was scheduled for 30 January. However, on the 30<sup>th</sup>, the ceremony was postponed, and a "popular" military demonstration in Pyongyang in support of the hard-line National Defense Council leader was reported. Observers speculated that a succession struggle was underway in North Korea.*

*On 31 January, counter demonstrations occurred in Pyongyang, and they soon spread nationwide; the KCNA was temporarily shut down and North Korean units along the border were reported to be on high alert. Humanitarian relief agencies reported that large numbers of people were leaving North Korean cities to seek food in the countryside. Observers speculated that the Ministry of State Security favored the continuation of Kim hereditary rule, while the mainstream military supported Defense Minister Oh Changyu, who was said to prefer continuation of Kim Chong-il-era policies under Defense Council authority. Localized violence between Korean People's Army (KPA) regular units and security service forces was reported, although KPA units near the DMZ were said to be united and on high alert. The Foreign Ministry and technocrats reportedly supported the Foreign Minister, Roh Yong-sun, who was said to endorse a drastic reduction in military expenditures, the formation of a DPRK/ROK standing group on investments and cooperative power projects, negotiations over final Nuclear Framework Accord inspections, the exchange of ambassadors with the United States, and the normalization of relations with Japan (including payment of Japanese reparations for occupation before and during World War II).*

*Large numbers of refugees were reportedly streaming toward China and Russia and also to be gathering along the DMZ. Apparently, there had been a relaxation of long-standing controls on travel with the DPRK. Moreover, North Korean troops were reported to be deliberately avoiding refugee camps along both borders and to be in a strictly defensive posture. However, several deaths were reported to have resulted from refugees attempting to cross DMZ minefields, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in North Korea reported paralysis of the transportation infrastructure, thus rendering assistance efforts nearly useless.*

## Initial Positions

Participants were assembled in a simulated United Nations Security Council to consider the issues presented in the scenario. Both North Korea and South Korea were present in the meeting, as well as an individual portraying the UN Secretary-General. This configuration resulted in a number of questions concerning UNSC procedures, and after discussion it was agreed that the meeting should be regarded as an informal Security Council session, with the Koreas not present officially, but nevertheless able to contribute to the discussion. There were some efforts to determine whether the UNSC should meet in a formal session, but at no point in the subsequent simulation did the UNSC meet formally. Armenia held the presidency of the Security Council. Participants from European Union countries agreed that Germany would occupy the EU presidency.

It should be noted that throughout the simulation, countries were very active outside the UNSC sessions. The Armenian representative played a particularly important role in facilitating discussions among countries, while the EU held several informal “European caucus” sessions wherein a common overall EU policy was agreed upon. The representatives of other countries also met informally in various configurations to discuss the situation in North Korea and sometimes to consider common action.



As UNSC President, Armenia actively moderated discussion during the session. At the conclusion of the first phase of the simulation, Armenia stated that the consensus of the UNSC favored caution, but also wished to deal adequately with humanitarian concerns.



South Korea noted that the incipient refugee crisis was also a major security issue because of the question of the integrity of the DMZ and that it was therefore in the interest of the United States to call a formal session of the Security Council. However, South Korea also offered to send a letter to the Secretary-General requesting a formal session. It was also suggested that a fact-finding mission be sent from the Security Council to “take the pulse” of events in Pyongyang and that a special envoy from the Secretary-General should be dispatched to discuss with North Korean officials issues related to refugees and the provision of food assistance. Moreover, South Korea strongly expressed its apprehension that a mass migration across the DMZ could result in a military confrontation and stated its conviction that a mass exodus of refugees from the North to the South must therefore be prevented.



North Korea strongly asserted that Kim Chong-II’s death did not imply that the government was not functioning. North Korea did admit there were a small number of hungry people within the country but said that speculation that people were moving South was false and that assuming hungry North Koreans were “refugees” was a distortion. In response to indications that the UNSC would be willing to alleviate the hunger problem, North Korea expressed its willingness to consider proposals.



China stated its belief that events in Pyongyang were an internal North Korean matter and expressed a reluctance even to discuss issues related to the likely succession struggle but did not oppose the gathering of information about the North Korean situation. It declined informal suggestions from other players that it call a formal Security Council session.



The United States was cautious in its reaction to events in North Korea. The United States maintained that it should not call a Security Council session, as this might appear alarming to Pyongyang, and that input from Russia and China should be sought actively by the UNSC. The United States also suggested that humanitarian assistance should be offered to North Korea in a non-threatening manner but noted that information collected from individuals delivering food to the DPRK would, along with news gleaned by Russia and China in their discussions with Pyongyang, provide a valuable pool of knowledge to the Security Council.



Canada expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in North Korea and for the safety of its citizens in that country. It stated its desire that the Secretary-General establish a fact-finding mission to the DPRK.



India noted that there were convincing signs of an ongoing succession struggle in Pyongyang but asserted that it was at present an internal North Korean matter. Therefore, India counseled restraint and recommended avoiding any actions that might worsen the situation in the DPRK, while advocating that the Security Council should be prepared to deal with humanitarian issues if the situation did worsen.



Britain suggested that the Secretary-General update members on the humanitarian situation in North Korea and that the UNSC President establish communication with North Korea.



France noted its concern for North Korean refugees and recommended that the Secretary-General use his channels to the World Food Program and other humanitarian organizations to gather information.



Germany expressed its concern over the possibility of large refugee flows across international borders and said that if this should occur the European Union was prepared to provide substantial aid to any country that required it.



Greece contended that it was not time for a “strong hand” and suggested proceeding with caution. It also informed the UNSC that a team of Greek physicians was willing to fly to North Korea to assist refugees.



Japan maintained that the most important immediate task was to establish lines of communication with North Korean authorities and also stated the importance of avoiding signals that might appear threatening. Japan also noted its concern that current humanitarian problems in North Korea could escalate into a mass refugee exodus.



Like China, Russia declined informal invitations to call a formal Security Council session. While expressing concern about the humanitarian situation, Russia argued that the DPRK was a sovereign state that could choose its own government and that under Article 34 of the UN Charter the UNSC did not have authority over the internal affairs of sovereign states. Russia also stated that it was already providing humanitarian assistance to a modest number of North Korea refugees who had crossed the border into Russia.

## **Scenario 1, Stage 2**

*For purposes of the scenario, it was now 4 February 2005—five days had passed since the last UNSC session.*


*The Secretary-General was invited to speak to the UNSC, and he updated the players on developments in the simulation. He stated that 50-75,000 refugees were now in China and 10-20,000 in Russia, with more coming. Also, 5,000 boats were on the way to Japan, and roughly 175,000 refugees were pressing to cross the DMZ, with additional refugees behind them. In response to questions from players, the Secretary-General stated there were indications that internal movement controls within North Korea had essentially been lifted and that the military did not appear to be interfering with refugee movement. However, he warned that attempts by refugees to cross the DMZ minefields could result in substantial casualties. The Secretary-General also informed the UNSC that UN officials had been sent to Pyongyang but that heretofore they had only been allowed contact with relatively low-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and were not allowed to inspect conditions in the southern DPRK. Regarding the North Korean military, he stated that there was no evidence of armed military personnel attempting to cross the DMZ or of a large-scale breakdown in discipline.*



North Korea stated that its process to elect a new leader was in place and declared that it was deeply insulted by the suggestion that its military was unwilling to distribute food to needy North Koreans. It stated that such a posture would be politically foolish, causing a loss of legitimacy and resulting in morale problems within the military. North Korea also said that it was a unique country because its policy was shaped by Kim Il-Sung and Kim Chong-II and that their authority remained in place even though they were physically deceased.



South Korea stated that if North Korea were intentionally letting refugees move South, this constituted a security threat and warned that Pyongyang might be seeking an excuse to fight a war with the South. However, the ROK also informed the UNSC that, along with the UN Combined Command, it was setting up refugee camps suitable for 100,000 refugees within the DMZ and just south of it, so as to provide for the needs of the North Korean refugees until it was possible to return them to their homes.



The United States warned that the situation in the DPRK was indicative of a breakdown in central authority and urged that, in addition to sending an envoy, the UNSC encourage urban refugees to return to their homes by announcing massive food shipments to North Korean ports. It was hoped that this would both assist in the reestablishment of order within North Korea and assist in “smoking out” who was actually in charge in Pyongyang.



Speaking as EU President, Germany urged that talking-points be developed for the President of the UNSC in his dealings with the press. Also, Germany noted that thus far there was no detailed assessment of food distribution needs and recommended that efforts be made to find out the refugee and food distribution situation within North Korea. In addition, Germany stated that the UNSC had no detailed military information on the situation in the DMZ, but that such details were required to determine if there was a way to flow refugees safely through the DMZ minefields. Therefore, a briefing from the UN Commander or his deputy was requested. Germany also suggested that the UNSC send a representative to North Korea, on condition that high-level North Korean officials agreed beforehand to meet with such an envoy. The purpose of such a mission would be to determine who was in charge in Pyongyang and whether food aid was acceptable to North Korea—and, if so, how the aid would be distributed.



Japan expressed its concern that no concerted diplomatic response to the North Korean situation had yet been made despite the fact that several days had passed since the beginning of the North Korean crisis. Japan recommended that the UNSC forge a common statement conveying the concern of the international community over the situation in North Korea, set up refugee camps and provide assistance to displaced North Koreans, and send a high-level UN commission, which would include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and an envoy from the office of the Secretary-General, to Pyongyang.



Australia indicated support for the Japanese proposal and stated that was prepared to take in 10-15,000 refugees who would return to North Korea when the situation permitted; support was also expressed for the American proposal to provide immediate food aid. Australia also noted that the EU and Japanese recommendations for action were not mutually exclusive and urged that a combined proposal be brokered between them.

Several countries debated whether a press statement should be issued by the President of the Security Council. India encouraged the issuance of a UNSC statement, but Greece stated that it was too early to issue a statement critical of specific groups, while China contended that it was too early for any statement and urged the Secretary-General to contact North Korea. The European Union and Japan arrived at a common proposal for talking points. However, Russia and China objected to some of the language in the EU-Japanese proposal. No final agreement was reached on talking points, and time elapsed for that portion of the simulation.

### **Scenario 1, Stage 3**

*On 10 February 2000, senior military members completed a coalition with former Kim supporters among diplomats and politicians, and announced that the new chairman of the National Defense Council would be Gen. Oh Changyu. Gen. Oh imposed curfews and martial law throughout the DPRK and transferred internal security authority from the Ministry of State Security to the KPA. Security forces were said to have cracked down on anti-regime demonstrators, and arrests were also reported in military units. Meanwhile, DPRK spokesmen announced the execution of the Foreign Minister for treasonous acts against the state. On the same day, the Minister of Commerce sought asylum at the South Korean embassy in Beijing, and the Minister of Finance sought asylum in the Vietnamese embassy in Pyongyang.,*

*On 13 February, the KCNA warned against US and South Korean “adventurism” and announced that the KPLA was on full military alert. Additional troops were ordered to move toward the southern border to assist citizens in the return to their homes and to facilitate food distribution. The DPRK also called on China and Russia to assist in stabilizing the international borders. Defense Council Chairman Gen. Oh demanded the immediate removal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula and the suspension of US theater missile defense (TMD) agreements with Japan. The DPRK also announced that it had formed a joint commission with Pakistan to expand cooperation on “important military technologies,” and North Korean naval vessels entered the Northern Limit Line zone.*

*On 19 February, Pyongyang provided a Notice to Mariners of the closure of areas in the North Pacific and northern Sea of Japan until the end of the month. Open press reports based on unnamed foreign intelligence sources reported preparations for a “test” launch at the Nodong missile launch site. On 22 February, reports from NGOs contained many indications of severely worsening famine and lawlessness, including large-scale suffering among refugees and rapidly increasing numbers of deaths due to starvation and disease among those unable to reach relief sites. Also, there were multiple reports of armed violence against relief workers and KEDO engineers.*

The President of the UNSC opened the session by suggesting that South Korea provide its view of events on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK stated that it was closely consulting with the United States and was relieved to see the formation of a new central authority in North Korea. It proposed a government-to-government meeting with the North, and said that it would provide food aid on a massive scale. South

Korea also stressed the importance of the Northern Limit Line issue and asked for continuing UNSC attention to this matter.



North Korea refused to engage in bilateral discussions with the South claiming that the latter was completely dependent on the United States militarily and stating that it would rather hold talks directly with the United States. It also maintained that all rumors of conflict between domestic factions were unfounded and that the refugee situation was under control but did note that humanitarian aid was welcomed for now.



The United States expressed its readiness to support South Korean efforts to deal with new DPRK authorities and stated that it was prepared to consider raising its defense readiness condition (DEFCON) alert level until unusual Northern troop movements ceased. The North and South Koreans were encouraged to discuss the Northern Limit Line issue in bilateral talks.



Japan stated that it was ready to engage constructively with North Korea if the latter displayed a positive attitude on questions related to ballistic missile development but cautioned that it was as yet unsure what attitude the new North Korean authorities would take. Japan also expressed its willingness to extend humanitarian assistance so long as it reached North Koreans who were in need.



China expressed general support for South Korea's proposals but said there was a need to clarify certain issues. It suggested that North Korean and Pakistani military cooperation might not be intended to threaten other countries and recommended that every party should try to decrease military tension on the Korean Peninsula.



India warned that North Korean "adventures" on the subcontinent would be dangerous.



Russia stated that it was pleased that no immoderate action was planned by any country and counseled restraint by United States in regard to the possibility of raising its DEFCON level. Russia also stated that it maintained contact with Pakistan and said that the Pakistanis had made it clear that they would not attempt to acquire any threatening capabilities.




The EU expressed support for the efforts of its friends, particularly South Korea's attempts to open dialogue with North Korea. It also condemned the summary execution of the DPRK Foreign Minister, and called on Pakistan and North Korea to respect their international obligations and called on the latter not to test-fire missiles.

The possibility of issuing a UN statement regarding developments in North Korea was discussed, but players disagreed on the contents of such a statement. India desired that language be included indicating that certain members of the UNSC were very concerned about North Korean-Pakistani military activities, but Russia pointed out that legally the two states had the right to establish a military cooperation commission; China indicated support for the Russian position. Great Britain recommended the inclusion of language mirroring the EU condemnation of the execution of the DPRK Foreign Minister, but Russia opposed this clause.

## Out of Role Discussions

On day two of the event, participants discussed the simulation together and employed networked computers using GroupSystems™ software to register comments anonymously in writing. The discussion began with reflections on how countries had viewed the role play the previous day.



The Armenian participant expressed frustration at the slowness of the UNSC reaction to events. However, he did believe that it was prudent of the UNSC not to contribute to the climate of uncertainty and to delegate responsibility to the United States and South Korea. He also noted that the ability of tiny political issues to disable the decisionmaking capability of the UNSC was “not far away from real life.”



The South Korean participant said that when Kim Il-Sung died, his government would not have wanted to give the impression that it was attempting to take advantage of the situation. Thus, the South Korean government might have asked surrogates to speak on its behalf and taken other measures to distance itself from the internal politics of North Korea. However, mass human rights violations would have provided a rationale for South Korea’s active involvement. In any event, he saw consultation among South Korea, Japan, the United States, Russia, and China as necessary to the successful resolution of the crisis. Regarding the WMD threat presented by North Korea, he also noted that if it were ever confirmed that North Korea did in fact possess nuclear weapons, South Korea would likely respond by building its own arsenal and that this in turn would likely result in a Japanese decision to construct nuclear weapons. Also, he warned that any future failed coup attempt in North Korea could result in a dangerous situation on the Peninsula.



The Japanese participant stated that the most serious limitation of the exercise had been the lack of variety in discussions. The death of Kim Chong-II was a serious event, but discussion tended to focus largely around procedural questions rather than “big issues,” such as the long-term relationship between the North and South or determining a UNSC consensus on the preferred end-state for the Korean Peninsula.

He also agreed with the South Korean participant that North Korean WMD development could create a dangerous arms race in the region.



The participant portraying North Korea maintained that sufficient information was presented in the scenario to make it realistic and that participants should have been able to guess about North Korean intentions based on limited information. He said that with a state like the DPRK, decisionmakers tend to use conventional wisdom but that the DPRK cannot be explained in the same way as other countries. In fact, North Korea had much in common with a religious sect. Therefore, psychological explanations of North Korean behavior were best and sufficient information must be provided to make judgements. He suggested that orientation sessions with experts who would discuss the country might be useful before a simulation commenced, as players would then be better versed in the North Korean system and able to “read between the lines.” He also asserted that relations between the two Koreas had always been guided by mutual incompatibility, and therefore Pyongyang would be unable to work constructively with South Korea in negotiations. However, North Korea might be able to deal productively with third countries.

Also, the participant portraying North Korea agreed with the South Korean participant that an attempted coup in North Korea could be dangerous and as an example suggested that if Kim Chong-II were killed in a coup attempt, a North-South war might occur if Kim loyalists ultimately thwarted the coup leaders. Given the quasi-religious nature of the North Korean regime, the Kim loyalists might attack the South if they were convinced that Seoul or Washington had organized the failed coup even if they believed such an attack to be suicidal.



The Canadian participant asserted that, as it developed, the scenario would have caused a major public outcry in Canada, including fear for the safety of Canadian nationals in Korea, concern for refugees, and “criticism of Canada’s ‘human security’”

approach when so many past efforts [could] be wiped out so quickly.” Nevertheless, the participant had chosen not to call for UNSC action, as widespread loss of life had not occurred



The German participant said that the UNSC discussed only a limited set of facts and that in a real situation more information would be available and asserted that the limited factual base made the simulation artificial. He also indicated that he believed the threat posed to the United States and other countries by North Korea has generally been exaggerated and that this has helped Pyongyang to extort funds from other countries. He also noted that there is an ongoing dialogue between North Korea and the European Union, although it is relatively unpublicized. He also suggested if the Koreas unified the continued presence of US forces on the Peninsula would be brought into question.



An American participant recognized the comments of other participants who had expected the United States to take a higher profile but stated that he had wanted to leave room for South Korea, China, Russia, and other countries to work together. He noted that the scenario had not initially triggered WMD concerns and said that if weapons of mass destruction had been involved the United States would have been forced to take a higher-profile role. He also expressed approval for present-day South Korean diplomatic initiatives that build good relations with neighbors such as Japan, Russia, and China but warned that, in a real crisis, the international press and other pressures might have negatively affected US decisionmaking.



The Indian participant contended that real-life UNSC deliberations were generally more decisive than those on day one of the simulation and stated that he would have liked to have known more about the internal decisionmaking of the United States, South Korea, and other countries. He stated that power on the UNSC had shifted in recent years, and that the United States is the chief power on the UNSC—and the question of what actions the United States, South Korea, and Japan desired was thus very important. He also noted that the scenario had not ended well for the world, as a hard-line regime that intended to increase international proliferation problems had successfully taken power in North Korea.



The Russian participant stated that his position was generally in accordance with the other players on humanitarian issues but that suspicion of the motives of other countries overshadowed its actions. He contended that the Kosovo crisis had made Russian policymakers suspicious of the possible exploitation of humanitarian crises by other states. Thus, he was constantly watching for tricks and would have considered any movement of US troops closer to the Russian border to be an undesirable outcome. Moreover, he had been ready to deadlock humanitarian action and was even prepared to redeploy nuclear-armed bombers to the Far East to prevent a US military movement into North Korea. The Russian participant praised the good judgment of American policymakers in the simulation but cautioned that in an actual crisis Moscow would likely have been more forceful and China would probably have been less cooperative with the other members of the UNSC.



The Swedish participant complimented the German participant’s efforts to present the views of the EU countries and indicated that the Security Council should have spent more time discussing the dangerous situation along the DMZ. The participant also stressed that Sweden had maintained a concern during the simulation about the deteriorating humanitarian situation and thought it important to assure that China and Russia would cooperate regarding major refugee flows into their countries.



A British participant suggested that the amount of information provided was sufficient but perceived that the level of the crisis was too low to stimulate an active response by the UNSC and suggested that external pressures such as public opinion should have played a greater role.

## **Anonymous GroupSystems™ Comments**

Participants were given the opportunity to comment anonymously on a number of issues regarding the first scenario and possible developments in North Korea that would flow from it. It should be noted that participants were not asked to be “in role” when using GroupSystems™ in this phase of the simulation.

In response to a question concerning what they expected would happen after the events spelled out in the scenario, comments varied widely. Some participants suggested that although there might be a period of uncertainty in Pyongyang, North Korean policies would ultimately be similar to those pursued during the Kim years. However, a few participants warned of the possibility of increased instability on the Peninsula, and some comments argued that it was important that Pyongyang be discouraged from further “test” firing of missiles.

Regarding what the international community could do to shape the situation and what would constitute a desirable outcome, numerous participants expressed the belief that outside countries probably had little power to shape North Korean events. Several comments suggested that efforts be made to open a dialogue with the North and one even raised the possibility of offering a security guarantee by the Permanent Five members of the UNSC if Pyongyang agreed to certain conditions. Participants were split on the question of whether international food aid should have been provided unconditionally.

## **Alternative Scenario**

In order to stimulate discussion of a quite different evolution of events in North Korea, the following Alternative Scenario was presented.

*On 26 January 2005, the death of Kim Chong-il was reported by the KCNA as having occurred three days earlier, on 23 January. On 28 January, the KCNA announced that a Funeral Committee, headed by National Assembly leader Lee Tae Ho, was being formed. On 30 January, a memorial service was conducted by Lee Tae Ho, who was now identified as interim Prime Minister. On 31 January, the Minister of Defense sought asylum in the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang, while the Interim Secretary General of the Korean Workers Party did the same in the Chinese Embassy.*

*By 1 February, the new government had consolidated military support by dismissing Kim supporters and promoting soft-line “reformers.” On 2 February, the KCNA began to note the need for economic reform. On 5 February, the interim Prime Minister declared that joint ventures with foreign investors were preferable to grants as a road to true self-reliance, i.e., “juche in light of present-day realities.” He called on Hyundai to add tourist destinations and quadruple tourism to the DPRK, invited foreign investors to Pyongyang to discuss ways to stimulate investment and announced a goal of five percent real annual growth in GDP and the tripling of exports by 2009, and requested US sponsorship for North Korean membership in the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. On that same day, the DPRK also offered family exchanges and proposed North-South Senior Dialogue on several questions: negotiation of a permanent peace treaty to replace the Korean War Armistice Agreement; Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), including the exchange of officers, invitations to observe exercises, and possibly arms reductions; a schedule for the removal of foreign troops; international food aid and assistance from international financial institutions; the removal of impediments to trade flows across the “so-called” Demilitarized Zone; and establishment of a Peninsular Assembly. North Korea also expressed its willingness to enter four or six country talks and requested agenda suggestions from participating states.*

After the briefing of the Alternative Scenario out-of-role anonymous GroupSystems™ comments were again solicited from participants.

In reply to a question concerning how they believed events would develop after the Alternative Scenario, a substantial number of participants stated that the Alternative Scenario itself was unrealistic. Some

participants asserted that the scenario was simply “too good to be true,” while one contended that the Alternative Scenario mixed two North Korean options—“Chinese” and “Russian” reform, the latter being simultaneous political and economic reform and the former being economic reform without immediate political reform, and that the outcome in North Korea could be differ substantially depending on which path Pyongyang chose. However, many participants accepted the possibility that the Alternative Scenario could occur, and several comments asserted that South Korea would respond positively to the developments contained in the Alternative Scenario.

A number of comments addressed the question of whether US troops would remain on the Peninsula, and several participants asserted strongly that the events in the Alternative Scenario would result in heavy pressure for rapid American withdrawal from the ROK. Other participants disagreed with the contention that American withdrawal was virtually inevitable under the conditions of the Alternative Scenario and noted that there were also pressures for the continued stationing of US troops in the South.

One participant warned that a “reform” DPRK government might not survive for very long, as reactionary elements could eventually rally and overthrow it, but some participants mentioned the prospect that Russia, China, Japan, and the United States might rethink their relations with the two Koreas, and one asserted that China and Russia would call for an international conference to “discuss developments” on the Peninsula; moreover, a participant noted that the EU might be willing to implement a large economic reconstruction program in the North.

Participants were then invited to engage in an out-of-role discussion of the Alternative Scenario.



The German participant pointed out that if the security situation improved on the Korean Peninsula, the US force posture in the ROK would be affected. Moreover, he asserted that the actual unification of the Koreas would possibly result in the withdrawal of American forces from the Peninsula, and this in turn would possibly impact the US presence in Japan.



The participant portraying North Korea found the Alternative Scenario much less plausible than the first one because of its treatment of military issues. He asserted that Pyongyang’s obsession with military preparedness should not be underestimated: the DPRK remains captivated by the principle of military self-reliance and it would be very difficult to convince the North to suspend weapons development, although issues related to actual deployment might be negotiable.



The Russian participant asserted that regardless of developments it would not expect the United States to withdraw completely from South Korea and that in any case the US presence would likely be a stabilizing factor on the Peninsula. Regarding North Korean economic development, he thought that much would depend on how Pyongyang chose to implement market reforms and warned that it takes years for a country to learn how to operate a free market economy. He thought it likely that military reform would have to be postponed until after economic reform—and that the latter would take ten years or more.



The South Korean participant stated that it would welcome the developments contained in this alternative scenario and said that if North Korea re-deployed its troops and decreased military spending, South Korea might be flexible on questions related to US forces on the Peninsula and their missions. He also expressed a willingness to provide immediate humanitarian aid and consider long-term investment in North Korean economic development, possibly including underwriting the borrowing of international capital for development projects in the North.



An American participant stated that American flexibility would be very important to the successful outcome of the Alternative Scenario and cautioned that China, Russia, and other countries would have concerns, and those issues could derail positive change if they were not addressed adequately. He also warned that there was no guarantee

that the dramatic changes in North Korea would not be reversed and, therefore, that the premature removal of US troops from South Korea would possibly have a negative impact on the stability of the entire Northeast Asia region.

The Secretary-General noted that changes in the political organization of the Korean Peninsula on the scale envisioned in the alternative scenario would likely provide the impetus for the creation of new intra-Asian organizations or the modification of existing ones. An American participant agreed that this was likely and said that South Korea has been thinking in terms of an “ASEAN plus three” or a similar security organization. The Canadian participant said that the Asian Development Bank could play a major role in the economic development of North Korea. The South Korean participant stated that the ROK had been contemplating the creation of an international organization to assist North Korea in revitalizing its agricultural sector, and asserted that if the North became willing to accept foreign investment new structures would be necessary.

### **Anonymous GroupSystems™ Comments on Other Questions**

After the discussion of the Alternative Scenario participants addressed several questions pertaining to possible future developments on the Korean Peninsula.

In response to a question concerning what other scenarios they thought were plausible for North Korea’s future, a variety of comments were received. Several participants commented that the current DPRK government could remain in power for a long time, but a number noted that they believed long-term erosion of the regime was likely. One participant asserted that the North Korean economy would likely continue to deteriorate and a collective leadership that would include the KPA would eventually take power and slowly “open” the DPRK. However, another participant warned that a progressive worsening of its economic situation might cause North Korea to conclude that to preserve its regime it had to pursue military options.

Several participants mentioned the prospect of conflict within the North Korean elite, and some alluded to the possibility of civil war in the North—and that such a conflict could spill over into the South. One participant raised the possibility that a failed coup attempt could result in troops from a defeated faction marching southward and attempting to cross the DMZ and find sanctuary in the South—a dangerous situation that could result in localized fighting involving North and South Korean troops. A participant raised the possibility that South Korea might at some point unilaterally intervene in the North, while another raised the possibility that Japan might preemptively strike the North if it sensed an imminent threat of a biological or nuclear attack.

A few participants asserted that economic reform of some kind was probable, and that this would lead to gradual political change; the possibility of “Chinese-style” economic reform was mentioned in numerous comments. One participant asserted that economic change and the leakage of information about the outside world into the DPRK would likely lead to a slow controlled opening to the ROK, which would be interrupted by tension and incidents—and that such a progressive opening of the North would suit the interests of China, Russia, the United States, and other countries. Also, one comment indicated that the DPRK will improve its food situation through developing agricultural technology and attracting foreign investment in agricultural genetics and the livestock industry. A number of participants contended that North Korea’s diplomatic ties to other states would likely increase and that several major states would exchange ambassadors with Pyongyang.

In response to a question on how the international community could positively impact events on the Peninsula, a number of ideas were offered. As with a similar question regarding the first scenario, some participants warned that the international community had little leverage with the North and could likely do little to shape internal DPRK politics. However, several participants recommended that the international community attempt to open an ongoing dialogue with the North and to discourage North Korean paranoia and international isolation.

One participant suggested the creation of an international organization to encourage regional peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, while another recommended the creation a “Korean Peninsula Agricultural Development Organization” (KADO)—funded by Japan, South Korea, and the United States—that would assist in the revitalization of North Korean agriculture. One participant raised the possibility that an international conference on the North Korean economic situation could be held. Also, a participant suggested that the DPRK might be convinced to abandon WMD and missile development if it were granted an international “security umbrella.”

## GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

*In an effort to avoid provoking negative reactions, the governments of the United States and South Korea reacted cautiously to developments in North Korea. Both South Korea and the United States expressed concern that vigorous action on their part could impede possible positive change and/or cause an existing crisis to worsen; they expressed a willingness to act circumspectly so long as the DPRK did not undertake militarily aggressive actions. Also, the United States stated its concern that assertive action on its part could undermine Seoul’s long-term efforts to build strong diplomatic ties with other countries in the region. Although many countries welcomed this posture, several found it surprising; particularly strong action was expected from the United States.*

Both South Korean and American players expressed their concern that vigorous action on their part could impede possible positive change and/or cause an existing crisis to worsen. Moreover, the United States expressed concern that assertive action could undermine Seoul’s efforts to build strong diplomatic ties with other countries in the region. North Korea and the United States assumed that while undergoing an internal political crisis, the DPRK would be particularly sensitive to foreign actions, and would be extremely suspicious even of offers of aid. Neither country attempted to push Pyongyang “over the brink” and bring about a North Korean collapse, although they expressed the belief that public opinion, the press, and other factors might make it difficult for those countries—particularly the United States—to respond cautiously to a DPRK political crisis. It is notable that several European players mentioned that they had expected that it would be necessary for them to restrain the United States and discourage military escalation and were surprised that it was not necessary to do so.

*The representatives of several countries thought that a scenario of peaceful and gradual economic and political integration of the Korean Peninsula was implausibly optimistic even though current US and South Korean policy strives for such an outcome.*

There was considerable pessimism concerning the possibility of positive medium-term developments on the Korean Peninsula. There was a general view that Pyongyang would continue to be reluctant to change, and several players regarded the Alternative Scenario with skepticism. However, a United States representative responded that significant change can occur in five years and by 2005 the political environment on the Peninsula may be favorable to such an outcome.

*Unification of Korea could cause China, Russia, and possibly other countries to press for the rapid removal of US troops from Korea; in turn, American withdrawal from Korea could have a “domino effect” on its presence elsewhere in the region, including Japan.*

The reaction of countries in regard to the possible future withdrawal of US troops from the Peninsula was mixed, and some—including the United States—warned that ending the American military presence in South Korea could be destabilizing. However, the South Korean delegate expressed a willingness to discuss US force structure in South Korea, as well as roles and missions, although he did not indicate an acceptance of the proposition that US forces could be removed from the Peninsula entirely. However, several delegates noted that events such as those described in the alternative scenario would result in pressure for an American withdrawal from both South Korea and Japan.

***Strong pressures to resist unification were reflected in South Korean apprehension about the political, economic, and social costs.***

As mentioned above, South Korea did not attempt to use the political instability in Pyongyang to undermine the North Korean regime. Indeed, the South Korean representative showed a great reluctance to alter the status quo, and in scenario one expressed relief when a stable government emerged in the North even though it was led by “hard-liners.” Moreover, the Russian representative sounded a cautionary note based on his country’s difficult experience in making the transition to democracy and a market economy, while the German representative underscored the costs of unification with a poorer country.

***The lack of good intelligence on North Korea and of North-South CBMs make it impossible to dismiss the possibility of a war between the Koreas even though it is probable that neither country desires such a conflict.***

The South Korean representative was especially concerned that conflict between rival North Korean military forces could spill over to the South: for example, he said that the retreating troops of a losing faction attempting to cross the DMZ might be pursued by soldiers from another faction. Confused border clashes, and further escalation, could result. The presence of large numbers of refugees and the intense secrecy of the North Korean system would further complicate such a situation.

***There was general agreement that regardless of political complications, a prompt response to humanitarian emergencies was important, and the representatives of several countries indicated a willingness to expend substantial resources to diffuse a refugee crisis in North Korea.***

All countries expressed a desire to assist in the resolution of the North Korean refugee crisis, and several suggested that they would be willing to spend substantial sums to assist the refugees; Australia even indicated that it would be willing temporarily to accept and provide for 10-15,000 North Koreans.

***European countries will likely show a high degree of cohesion in responding to a crisis in Korea and will likely address the situation through the European Union rather than unilaterally.***

EU countries, particularly the United Kingdom, showed a degree of independence in shaping their responses to North Korean events, but they all proved willing to work together to resolve the crisis. The players frequently met outside the UNSC sessions and shaped a common policy that stressed humanitarian aid and a cautious response to North Korean developments.

## **POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

***International forums such as the UNSC would have difficulty coping effectively with a Korean crisis unless key countries such as the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia were in agreement on common action. The latter two countries might, however, see significant divergence between some of their interests and the interests of other countries, especially the United States.***

Even seemingly small issues, such as the language of proposed statements to the press, sometimes frustrated the UNSC. Russia and China were both concerned that any change in the *status quo* on the Peninsula could work to their disadvantage and thus they tended to obstruct the formation of a UNSC consensus on action. However, there were some confluent interests, including the prevention of mass

refugee migration, and both Russia and China expressed a willingness to cooperate on humanitarian initiatives.

Most countries other than Russia and China expressed a desire to use US policy as yardstick. This did not mean that they intended unambiguously to accept American initiatives, but they did plan to react to US policy—by, for example, attempting to moderate any actions that were considered potentially escalatory or imprudent. The simulation indicated that international forums might be unable to deal effectively with a North Korean crisis unless the United States and South Korea together provided leadership.

***In the event of unification, Russia and China would strongly oppose deployment of US troops in former North Korea.***

Participants indicated that a reduction of tensions on the Peninsula would almost certainly result in strong pressures on the United States to modify its force structure in South Korea and would result in more radical change, including complete withdrawal from South Korea and Japan. However, there was no consensus that the latter outcome would be desirable, and the United States expressed considerable reservations about such a possibility.

***Outside powers have little leverage over events in North Korea.***

Discussions in the Security Council often focused on the fundamental problem of how to obtain information about developments in Pyongyang, and no serious effort was made to control developments within North Korea or to support reformist factions in their struggle against hard-liners. Even offers of aid were made carefully, out of fear that Pyongyang would regard such offers as somehow threatening. No country suggested that attempts be made to use aid to control North Korean events or that offers of humanitarian aid be made contingent on any particular behavior by Pyongyang.

***Most powers share a common interest in stability on the Korean Peninsula.***

It was not surprising that Russia and China were wary of any change in the *status quo*, as they tended to see such change as potentially detrimental to their own interests. However, the United States, the European Union, and Japan all stressed the need for stability over the potential benefits flowing from change within the DPRK. Even South Korea, because of fear of inciting military conflict and worries about the huge costs of unification, refrained from attempting to take advantage of North Korea's temporary weakness. However, it was notable that when the alternative scenario was presented and the ROK saw the prospect of slow change that might result in unification over the course of decades, it responded vigorously, showing a firm willingness to spend substantial sums and negotiate closer relations with North Korea.

## **Concluding Thoughts**

Except in regard to humanitarian aid, there was a great reluctance on the part of most countries to act forcefully in response to the crisis scenario presented in the simulation. Moreover, both China and Russia were wary of initiatives presented by other countries and frequently expressed concern for North Korean sovereignty. Even seemingly small issues sometimes stymied international action. Overall, the international community was unable to guide events significantly in the North because it had little leverage over North Korea and very limited information about political developments in that country.

During the simulation, one interesting area of agreement among participants emerged: a tendency to favor the *status quo*, or even a more hard-line North Korean regime, over instability on the Korean Peninsula. For various reasons, most countries saw instability as threatening to their interests; even South Korea expressed fear of rapid political change in the DPRK. Most countries—including the United States, Japan, Russia, and China—appeared relatively accepting of (although not altogether satisfied with) the *status quo*.

This was a strong indication that the “long crisis” on the Korean Peninsula might endure for decades rather than soon resolving itself in a swift and peaceful unification or a terrible military confrontation.

## Korea Chronology

57 B.C.-668 A.D.	The Three Kingdoms Period
668-918	Unified Korea of Shilla
918-1392	Koryo Period
1392-1910	Yi Dynasty Period
1592	April, Japanese invasion; July, construction of ironclad war vessels (turtle boats); Adm Yi Sun -sin's great naval victory. January, second Japanese invasion.
1627	First Manchu invasion.
1636	December, second Manchu invasion.
1876	February, Kanghwa Treaty with Japan.
1882	Treaties with United States and Japan.
1883-84	Treaties with Great Britain, Russia, Germany, Italy.
1887	First Korean minister to United States.
1894	Sino-Japan War. Korea -Japan Mutual Defense.
1895	Treaty of Shimonoseki: Sino-Japan War ends.
1896	August, division of Korea into 13 provinces.
1901-03	Treaties with Belgium, Austria, and Denmark.
1904	February, Russo-Japanese War. Agreement with Japan.
1905	September, Portsmouth Treaty: Russo-Japanese War ends.
1907	July, anti-Japanese guerilla warfare begins. August, Coronation of Emperor Sunjong. November, proclamation of six-article charter.
1909	September, treaty with China and Japan concerning Korea -Manchuria border.
1910	August 22, Treaty of Annexation: Korean independence ends.
1910-1945	Japanese Colonial Period.
1945	August, Soviet Union declares war on Japan. August, Soviets invade Korea. Japanese accept Potsdam ultimatum. Liberation of Korea. September, Korea divided into two zones at 38 <sup>th</sup> parallel.

	September 6, Declaration of Peoples Republic of Korea.
1945-1948	Allied Occupation Period
1945	September, US Army Military Government in Korea. December, Moscow Agreement regarding Korea.
1946	January, Flight of Korean Democratic Party to south.
1947	February, Central Peoples Committee formed in North Korea. June, South Korean interim government formed in Seoul. November, UN General Assembly Resolution on Korea. Creation of UN Temporary Commission on Korea.
1948	Republic of Korea established.
1948	May, UN sponsored general elections in ROK. North Korea suspends electric power to the ROK. July 12, ROK constitution adopted. December, UN recognizes ROK.
1950	May, National Assembly elections in ROK. June 25, DPRK invasion of ROK. June 25, GAR and UNSCR 82. June 27, UNSCR 83. July, Formation of UN forces command. July 7, UNSCR 84. July 31, UNSCR 85. September 15, Inchon landing. October 1-7, UN troops cross 38 <sup>th</sup> parallel. November 8, UNSCR 88. November, UN troops withdrawn from DPRK.
1951	January 31, UNSCR 90. March, recovery of Seoul.
1952	August, President Rhee reelected.
1953	July 27, Korean armistice signed. October 1, US/ROK Mutual Defense Treaty.
1956	May, President Rhee reelected.
1960	March, President Rhee reelected. November, ROK adopted new constitution.
1963	October, Park Chung-hee elected President.
1966	February, ROK troops sent to South Vietnam.
1968	January 21, Assassination attempt by DPRK commandos. January 23, USS Pueblo seized.
1972	July 4, North-South political dialogue. October 12, North-South Coordinating Committee.

1976	March, US President Carter announces plan to withdraw US troops. August, 2 US officers killed at Panmunjon.
1979	Arrests, demonstrations, martial law.
1980	August, Gen. Chun Doo-hwan elected President.
1983	February, DPRK MIG-19 pilot asks for asylum. May, highjacked Chinese airliner landed in ROK. September, Soviet fighter shoots down KAL 007. October, assassination attempt upon Chun in Rangoon.
1985	DPRK signed NPT. Ratified in 1992.
1987	April, Kim Dae-jung under house arrest. June, Roh Tae-woo plan for democratic reform. October, Assembly announces new constitution. November, DPRK bomb on KAL flight over Burma. December, Roh Tae-woo elected President.
1988	September 17, Seoul hosts 24 <sup>th</sup> Olympics.
1989	April 13, Rev. Moon Ik-hwan private visit to DPRK. May, peaceful demonstrations in Kwangju. June, Kim Young-sam meets with DPRK officials. June 27, Suh Kyong-won arrested for DPRK visits. July, Chinese delegate to Armistice defects to ROK. September, Roh proposes Korean reunification formula. US begins limited troop withdrawals.
1990	March, DPRK tunnels discovered. June, Roh and Gorbachev meet in San Francisco. Sepember, ROK establishes diplomatic relations with Soviet Union.
1991	September 17, ROK and DPRK join UN. USCR 702. October, ROK-DPRK talks in Pyongyang. December 13, Agreement between ROK and DPRK. December 31, Joint Declaration on Nonproliferation.
1992	May 22, ROK kills 3 DPRK soldiers in DMZ. June, DPRK signs IAEA safeguards agreement.
1994	July 8, Kim Il Sung dies. October 21, US and DPRK sign Agreed Framework.
1995	March, Dec, Korean Energy Development Organization Agreement. April, DPRK test fires missile across Sea of Japan.
1996	April, DPRK declares it will no longer observe Armistice. April, DPRK-sponsored incursions into South. April, US suggests Four Power Talks. September, DPRK submarine incursion. October, Suspected DPRK killings in Russia.
1997	December, Four Party Talks collapse in Geneva.

1998	February, Kim Dae-jung inaugurated in ROK. Resumption of bilateral initiatives. March, Second round of full Four-Party Talks.
1999	March, UN Land Mine Treaty. DPRK food shortages. US agrees to provide food aid. Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry visit to ROK and DPRK. May, US-DPRK talks for site inspection. Japan to lend \$1 billion to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization for reactors. ROK to buy Russian submarine. October, Perry Report.

Sources:

Jane's Information Group, 2<sup>nd</sup> Update, June 1998.

Matray, James I., ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Greenwood Press: New York, 1991).

McCann, David R., ed., Korea Briefing: Toward Reunification (M.E. Sharp: Armonk, NY, 1997).

Nahm, Andrew C., Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Korea (The Scarecrow Press: Metuchen, NJ, 1993).

US State Department Background Notes: South Korea, August 1999.

US State Department Background Notes: North Korea, June 1996.

